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Divorce Ex Parte Style
For more than one hundred years American courts have struggled
with the evolution of the ex parte divorce.' Prior to Simons v. Miami
Beach First National Bank2 the apparently settled doctrine as expressed
by the Supreme Court was that, while a divorce court could terminate
the marital status of the interested parties, its ex parte decree could
not affect any other valuable rights resulting from the marital rela-
tionship. In Simons the Court held that an ex parte divorce in Florida
extinguished the dower right in a Florida estate of an absent spouse
who was not personally served, entered no appearance, and had no
contact whatsoever with the State of Florida. Inasmuch as dower ap-
pears to constitute a valuable right, the seeming inconsistency of this
holding suggests a need for reappraisal of the doctrine of ex parte
divorce.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
The Supreme Court first dealt with ex parte divorce in Atherton v.
Atherton3 and Haddock v. Haddock.4 In these cases the Court held
that a divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit only when en-
tered by a court of the state of matrimonial domicile or by a court
exercising personal jurisdiction over both parties. Thus an ex parte
divorce decree had effect outside the rendering state only if that state
1 The term "ex parte divorce" will be used to describe a proceeding in which the
divorce court is unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse. The pos-
sibility of an ex parte divorce arose concurrently with the right of a married woman
to establish a domicile separate from that of her husband, see Williamson v. Osenton,
232 U.S. 619, 626 (1914); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166 (1901); Barber v. Barber,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I 87 (1856), thus creating the possi-
bility that either of two states could exercise jurisdiction over at least one of the parties
to the marital relationship.
At that time the authority of either state to grant a divorce to its own domiciliary
was found in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877), where the Court said: "[A]
State may ... authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens toward
a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service
of process or personal notice to the non-resident . . . . The State, for example, has
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."
2 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
a 181 U.S. 155 (1900).
4 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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contained the marital "res"; otherwise the decree was viewed as valid
only in the rendering state.
This doctrine remained unaltered for nearly forty years. Then, in
Williams v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that any ex
parte divorce, if valid in the granting state, was henceforth entitled
to full faith and credit. Recognizing that the previous doctrine, by
contemplating divorces as valid in one state but not elsewhere, had
resulted in polygamous marriages and a cloudy legal status for later
offspring, the Court said that it was bowing to "intensely practical
considerations" and was protecting the national interest in avoiding
these results. 6 The Court adopted its new policy of national uniformity
of marital status without explicitly deciding whether terminating the
marital status of an absent spouse might deprive her of a valuable
right. As Mr. Justice Jackson charged in dissent: "Settled family rela-
tionships may [now] be destroyed by a procedure that we would not
recognize if the suit were one to collect a grocery bill."7 Nevertheless,
the Court had implicitly answered Mr. Justice Jackson by concluding,
in effect, that the need to bring national uniformity to questions of
marital status8 outweighed the possible harm to the absent spouse-
if the suing spouse established domicile where he sued and if notice
was given to the defendant spouse.
While Williams entitled the ex parte divorce to an extraterritorial
effect it had not previously enjoyed, the Court limited its holding to
the issue of marital status. It explicitly reserved judgment regarding
the extraterritorial effect of the divorce on property interestsY It was
not until Estin v. Estin'o that the Court dealt with this problem. The
question presented in Estin was whether there were any circumstances
in which Nevada could adjudicate the absent wife's claim to alimony
under a prior New York separation judgment when she neither was
personally served nor appeared in the proceedings.
In resolving this problem, the Court adopted the doctrine of divis-
ible divorce and held in favor of the absent wife. It said that Williams
5 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6 Id. at 303.
7 Id. at 316.
8 By accepting the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), that a state may
determine the status of its own domiciliaries, the Court foreclosed the possible conclu-
sion that national uniformity might be achieved by limiting the divorcing power to the
marital domicile. The Court similarly precluded the possible conclusion that only the
law of the state of marital domicile may be applied by the divorce court by stating: "It
is difficult to perceive how North Carolina [the marital domicile] could be said to have
an interest in Nevada's domiciliaries superior to the interest of Nevada." 317 U.S. at 296.
9 Id. at 293.
10 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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had involved the "regularity and integrity of the marriage relation-
ship"" and consequently the protection of legitimate offspring and
the prevention of bigamous marriage. All of these, the Court said, are
vital concerns of the divorcing state and can only be protected by
allowing that state to exercise jurisdiction over the absent spouse
through constructive service. But, the Court continued, constructive
service would not necessarily support a decree "that changed every
legal incidence of the marriage relationship."'12 The Court held that
some incidents of the marital relationship can be affected only when
a court exercises personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse. One of
these incidents was the judgment for alimony on which Mrs. Estin
relied. In the Court's view the Estin situation was different from
Williams because of the significant interest of the absent wife's state
of domicile in protecting her from becoming "impoverished and per-
haps . . . a public charge,"'13 and because the alimony judgment
awarded by New York to protect this interest had vested a property
right in the wife.
In Mfay v. Anderson14 the Court included child custody as one of
the incidents that may be affected only when a court exercises personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, suggesting that the test was whether
the threatened incident constituted a "precious" personal right in
the absent spouse. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,15 the final pre-Simons
decision concerning divisible divorce, the Court further expanded the
doctrine by holding that it was immaterial in Estin that the support
claim had been reduced to judgment; even absent that circumstance
an ex parte divorce could not extinguish any support rights possessed
by the absent spouse.
Before considering Simons and its relationship to the earlier cases
on divisible divorce, two issues never adequately resolved by the Court
in any of the cases demand attention. First, the Court has never offered
an adequate rationale for its rulings that the absent wife's interest in
her marital status, unlike her interests in support and child custody,
may be extinguished by a court which is unable to exercise personal
jurisdiction over her. The answer given by the Court in Williams,
that the practical consequences of not allowing jurisdiction dictated
this result, has never provided the sole basis for jurisdiction in any
11 Id. at 546.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 547.
14 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
15 354 U.S. 416 (1957). See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 575-81 (1956) (Black,
J., concurring).
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other context. As held in Hansen v. Denckla:16 "However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be
called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with
that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.' 17
If necessity alone could support jurisdiction, surely the May case
should have been decided differently; the state in which the children
were domiciled should have been permitted to determine their cus-
tody despite the absence of their mother. But the Court held other-
wise on the ground that, regardless of the need to resolve the issue of
child custody, a "precious" right may not be affected by a court that
is unable to exercise jurisdiction over the possessor of that "right."
Although never suggested by the Court, a viable rationale for the
differing rights of the absent wife to procedural due process in cases
involving support or child custody and those involving marital status
alone would be that termination of her marital status does not deprive
her of a valuable "right" in the sense of "worsening" her position.
If only termination of marital status is involved, her position is not
worsened because the marital status itself is not legally enforceable:
in no state can husband and wife be forced to live together or to
extend to one another the affection and companionship which con-
stitute the value of marital status apart from its economic incidents.
Given the need for uniform marital status throughout the country,
constructive service can therefore be said to meet all due process re-
quirements when the issue is only that of termination of marital
status.'8
The second question not expressly answered in the cases is whether
an ex parte decree relating to matters other than the marital status can
be granted full recognition by another state. The clear implication of
the Court's opinions in both May and Vanderbilt, notwithstanding
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in May,' is that recognition by
16 857 U.S. 235, 251 (1957).
17 Ibid. The Court added: "[1]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [away from the
rigid rules of personal jurisdiction suggested in Pennoyer v. Neff] heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts .... Those restric-
tions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states."
Ibid.
18 Especially since the husband is usually the more mobile spouse, notions of due pro-
cess would seem to require that the absent wife who has not been personally served not
be deprived of a valuable right in an inconvenient forum. But as the right becomes less
valuable, the demands of due process become correspondingly less stringent.
19 It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's contention that the Court's opinion did not reach
the due process question, inasmuch as it held only that the Ohio court had incorrectly
felt bound to grant full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree, and that upon proper
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another state of a decree unsupported by personal jurisdiction would
constitute a denial of due process. As stated by the Supreme Court,
the divorcing court is "powerless to cut off . . . a spouse's right to
financial support .... [or] a mother's right to custody of her children, '20
and, as noted in a subsequent case: "Therefore .. . [a] decree, to the
extent it purport[s] to affect the wife's right to support . . [is] void
... "21 Surely the recognition of a void decree as a basis for depriving
a citizen of something of value would constitute a denial of due process
in any forum, including the one in which the original decree was
issued.
II. SIMONS V. MIAMI BEACH FIRST NATIONAL BANK22
In Simons, the specific question was whether a Florida ex parte
divorce could extinguish an absent spouse's dower interest in Florida
property under Florida law. Petitioner and Mr. Simons were married
and domiciled continually in New York until 1946, when she was
granted a permanent separation with alimony. In 1951 Mr. Simons
moved to Florida and the following year obtained a divorce in an
action in which Mrs. Simons was neither personally served nor entered
an appearance. During the remainder of his life, Mr. Simons fully
complied with his obligations under the separation decree. Upon his
death in 1960, and after the respondent, the executor of his estate,
had entered his will in probate, Mrs. Simons appeared and filed an
election to take dower under Florida law. The executor challenged
Mrs. Simons' claim, and the challenge was sustained by the Florida
District Court of Appeals. 23
reconsideration the Ohio court might still recognize the Wisconsin decree. May v. An-
derson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953).
However, it does not appear that the Ohio court felt bound by the full faith and
credit clause. Rather, the court seems to have determined that under Ohio law the Wis-
consin court had the requisite jurisdiction to decide the question. May v. Anderson, 91
Ohio St. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358 (1952). Nor is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that Ohio
might still grant full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree supported by the Supreme
Court's own language, which frames the issue strictly in terms of whether a state may
cut off a mother's right to custody in an ex parte proceeding, and concludes that it may
not. Furthermore, if Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation is correct, the Supeme Court
should have vacated and remanded rather than reversed.
Mr. Justice Jackson maintained in dissent that the majority opinion could only be
interpreted as holding that a grant of full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree would
have denied the wife due process. 345 U.S. at 536-37.
20 Id. at 533-34.
21 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957).
22 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
23 Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank, 157 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963),
cert. denied, 166 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1964).
Below, Mrs. Simons challenged the validity of the Florida divorce by (1) questioning
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In the United States Supreme Court Mrs. Simons contended, first,
that under the Estin doctrine it was incumbent on the Florida Court
to grant full faith and credit to the New York separation decree, "in-
herent in which is a preservation of her dower right,"24 and second,
that, on the authority of the Vanderbilt case, she could not be deprived
of her dower rights under Florida law since she was not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Florida divorce court. The Supreme Court
summarily disposed of both contentions. In response to the claim that
full faith and credit was owing to the New York decree, the Court
held that "there is nothing in the New York decree itself that can be
construed as creating or preserving any interest in the nature of or
in lieu of dower." 25 As to the central issue of whether an ex parte
divorce, wherein the absent wife was served by publication, could
constitutionally extinguish her dower right in the husband's Florida
estate, the Court said only that "under Florida law no dower right
survived the decree .... [and] dower rights in Florida property, being
inchoate, are extinguished by a divorce decree predicated upon substi-
tuted or constructive service.''26
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that the Court's opin-
ion constituted a partial retreat from Vanderbilt.27 The language of
the Court, he contended, compelled the conclusion that one of the
rules emerging from Vanderbilt-that "an ex parte divorce can have
no effect on property rights"-now "slips unobtrusively into oblivion
. . . for Florida is allowed to turn property rights on its ex parte
decree."2 8
Justices Black and Douglas also concurred but rejected the conten-
tion that the Court intended any retreat. It was their view that the
case was distinguishable from Vanderbilt since the dower right "simply
never came into existence. '29
the validity of Mr. Simons' Florida domicile, and (2) arguing that the New York separa-
tion decree, by specifically denying the identical claims subsequently made by Mr. Simons
in Florida and rejecting his suit for separation, constituted res judicata. The Florida
District Court of Appeals rejected these arguments, holding that "any affirmative defense
the prior suit may have afforded should have been presented in the divorce suit," and
that by failing to appear, Mrs. Simons waived any defense. 157 So. 2d at 200.
Although the Florida courts did not consider whether a valid divorce might destroy
her dower rights, the Supreme Court assumed that "since Florida law allows dower only to
decedent's wife ... we interpret the Florida Courts' decisions sustaining the validity of the
divorce as also holding that the divorce extinguished petitioner's dower rights." 381 U.S.
at 83-84 nA.
24 Id. at 84.
25 Id. at 84-85.
26 Id. at 85.
27 Id. at 86.
28 Id. at 87.
29 Id. at 88.
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III. SIMONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
The fact that the case provoked two concurring opinions based on
contrary interpretations of the Court's language demonstrates the am-
biguity of the Court's opinion. This ambiguity makes the future of
the doctrine of divisible divorce unclear, for it is impossible to deter-
mine from the language whether the Court intended Simons to be a
partial retreat from Vanderbilt or a distinguishable problem.
If the Court was not retreating from Vanderbilt, there would seem
to be two possible bases on which the opinion could be explained: (1)
dower is somehow different from the other kinds of property interests
that the Court has protected in the past (as Justices Black and Douglas
contended); or (2) that a result different from Vanderbilt somehow
follows from the fact that Mrs. Simons sought to assert a property right
which arose under the law of the same state that rendered the divorce
decree and sought to assert that right in the courts of that state. Al-
though this second theory was not mentioned in any of the opinions
in Simons, it also merits examination.
Is Dower Somehow Different from the
Previously Protected Incidents of the Marriage Relationship?
The majority opinion in Simons seems to depend heavily on the
word "inchoate." The Court said that a dower right existed under
Florida law prior to the divorce,30 but added that "dower rights in
Florida property, being inchoate, are extinguished by a divorce decree
predicated upon substituted or constructive service. '31
Although no further analysis of the nature of the dower right ap-
pears in the Court's opinion, there was presented in a footnote an ex-
tensive quotation from a Florida case, Pawley v. Pawley,3 2 evidently
30 "[W]e interpret the Florida Courts' decisions sustaining the validity of the divorce
as also holding that the divorce extinguished petitioner's dower rights." Id. at 83-84 n.4.
31 Id. at 85. (Emphasis added.)
32 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950). "In this, if not in every jurisdiction, right
of dower can never be made the subject of a wholly independent issue in any divorce
suit. It stands or falls as a result of the decree which denies or grants divorce. It arises
upon marriage as an institution of any law .... It is not a right which is originated
by or is derived from the husband; nor is it a personal obligation to be met or fulfilled
by him, but it is a creature of the law, is born at the marriage altar, cradled in the
bosom of the marital status as an integral and component part thereof, survives during
the life of the wife as such and finds its sepulcher in divorce. Alimony, too, is an insti-
tution of the law but it is a personal obligation of the husband which is based upon
the duty imposed upon him by the common law to support his wife and gives rise to
a personal right of the wife to insist upon, if she be entitled to, it. It has none of the
incidents of, and is in no sense a lien upon or interest in, property. Consequently, the
right of the wife to be heard on the question of alimony should not, indeed lawfully it
cannot, be destroyed by a divorce decree sought and secured by the husband in an
1966]
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for the purpose of demonstrating that the nature of the dower right
under Florida law is such that an ex parte divorce decree can extin-
guish it. Six different characteristics which distinguish dower from
alimony under Florida law can be inferred from the Pawley quotation.
The Florida court suggests that dower, unlike alimony: (1) represents
an inchoate interest; (2) stands or falls solely as a result of the decree
granting or denying the divorce; (3) can never be made a wholly in-
dependent issue in any divorce suit; (4) does not create a personal
obligation of the husband based on the common law duty to support
his wife; (5) does not give rise to a personal right in the wife to insist
upon it; and (6) constitutes an interest in, or lien upon, property.
The first distinction, which is the only one mentioned by the
Supreme Court in the text of its opinion, appears to be irrelevant.
Whether a right is inchoate or vested seems to have little bearing on
whether the right is valuable and therefore should be protected against
deprivation without due process of law. Dower is a valuable right. The
fact that it may not be claimed at the time of the divorce proceeding
does not support the conclusion that it is not "property"* under the
fourteenth amendment and is not entitled to the due process protec-
tion afforded rights which are subject to claim at that time.33
Both Florida and New York, Mrs. Simons' domiciliary state, have
recognized that dower constitutes a valuable property interest of the
wife. One New York court has gone so far as to characterize dower as
"the most highly and widely cherished property right resulting from
the marriage and one which the courts have been alert to protect."3 4
New York has also recognized that survivorship rights, although "in-
choate," are valuable before they ripen. In an action for partition of
property held by the entirety,35 in which the plaintiff's former wife
relied on a Florida ex parte divorce decree, a New York court held
that a spouse's "right of survivorship . .. is a property right with
action wherein only constructive service of process was effected." Id. at 472-73 n.2, quoted
in 381 U.S. at 85-86 n.6.
33 See Baker's Ex'rs v. Kilger, 145 U.S. 487, 491 (1892), in which the Court held:
"[Although] the relation of husband and wife is . .. formed subject to the power of
the state to control and regulate both that relation and the property rights directly
connected with it," that regulation can be accomplished only "by such legislation as does
not violate those fundamental principles which have been established for the protection
of private and personal rights .... "
34 Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N.Y. 211, 216, 153 N.E. 51, 52 (1926). See also In re Schmidt's
Estate, 168 Misc. 534, 541, 6 N.Y.S.2d 213, 219 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
35 Like dower, a tenancy by the entirety constitutes a right of survivorship dependent
upon the continuance of the marital relationship. Huber v. Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 539, 209
N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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which only a court having jurisdiction of the property or of defen-
dant's person could deal."'36 In answer to plaintiff's contention that the
valid Florida decree "destroyed the status which is essential . . . to the
continuation of the property right,"37 the court stated that "federal
constitutional law proscribes giving the Florida decree the effect...
claimed for it."38
Florida, too, has recognized that dower, at the time of the divorce
proceeding, constitutes a valuable property right. While reaffirming
"the general rule that [in Florida] an appeal in a divorce proceeding
cannot be prosecuted after the death of one of the parties, except where
the decree of divorce affects the property rights of the parties," the
Supreme Court of Florida, in Busch v. Busch,39 upheld a surviving
"wife's" right to pursue her appeal from a divorce decree because of
the dower interest involved. Quoting with approval from a Nevada
case, First National Bank v. Wolff,40 the Florida court concluded that
"rights granted by operation of law and based upon the marital rela-
tionship, such as dower . .. , are held to be 'property rights.' "41 Thus,
there seems to be strong support for the argument that the dower right
-inchoate or not-is a valuable right and may not be extinguished
without the full protection guaranteed by the due process clause.
42
The second distinction implied by the Court's quotation from Paw-
ley, that dower stands or falls solely on the granting or denying of a
divorce, may be the law in Florida, but it does not follow that the
granting of an ex parte divorce should be allowed as a matter of con-
stitutional law to cut off dower automatically. The Pawley opinion im-
plies that dower has no meaning once the marital status is terminated.
However, there is no inherent reason why dower cannot stand inde-
pendently of the marital status. It does in many states, including New
York.43 As to the constitutional issue, the Pawley opinion only repre-
36 Id. at 541, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
37 Id. at 542, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
38 Ibid.
39 62 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952).
40 66 Nev. 51, 57, 202 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
41 Busch v. Busch, 62 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952).
42 Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued in his dissent in Vanderbilt that dower is entitled
to even greater protection than alimony:
There can be no "right" until the termination of the marriage, and the whole
question in the case is which State shall be able to determine the incidents of
the dissolution of the marriage status. Nor is analysis furthered by analogizing
the "right" to alimony to the dower "right," thence sliding to the conclusion that
since New York would not have to recognize a Nevada decree cutting off dower,
it does not have to recognize the Nevada decree cutting off alimony. The differ-
ences between a "right" to alimony and a dower "right" are so decisive that I
need not spell out why an assumed decision with respect to dower does not reach
our problem. (345 U.S. at 427.)
43 See Huber v. Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 539, 543, 209 N.Y.S.2d 637, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
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sents an unsupported conclusion on the very question at issue: whether
a state can constitutionally terminate an absent party's dower right on
the basis of an ex parte decree.
The third suggestion is that dower can never be made the subject
of an independent issue in a divorce proceeding-that, unlike alimony,
there is no dower question to be adjudicated by the divorce court.
Thus, because dower is not a right that Mrs. Simons could have raised
had she appeared, there is no reason to place her in the more advan-
tageous position of having that right protected merely because she
failed to appear.
If this argument is a fair statement of the reasoning underlying
Simons, then the significance of the case is that it creates a limitation
on the Vanderbilt doctrine. For this suggests that the Vanderbilt doc-
trine protects only those valuable rights-like alimony and child cus-
tody-which could have been preserved, despite the granting of the
divorce, by the appearance of the absent spouse in the inconvenient
forum. Previously, Vanderbilt might have been understood to imply
that no valuable right could be cut off by an ex parte divorce.
Were this argument supported by considerations of good policy, it
would be a tenable reconciliation of Simons with Vanderbilt. How-
ever, it appears to create a rule which is undesirable for at least two
reasons. First, if the distinguishing feature of dower is that the ex
parte divorce does not "worsen" the wife's position because, short of
successfully contesting the entire divorce, she cannot preserve the
dower right by appearing, then the entire Williams doctrine is called
into question. As suggested above, the only rationale which appeared
to support the use of constructive service in Williams was that the
absent wife's position was not "worsened" by the termination of her
marital status because that adjudication deprived her of no valuable
right.44 Now the Court has said in effect that a valuable right, dower,
is bound up in the marital status itself, and that the termination of
the status extinguishes the right. If this is indeed the rationale of
Simons, the Court has destroyed what appeared to be the only justifi-
cation for Williams-that no valuable rights were involved in an ex
parte divorce-and has thereby clouded the entire ex parte divorce
doctrine.45
("[D]ower is not dependent upon the continuance of marriage.'); cf. MADDEN, DO=ESTIC
RELATIONS §§ 182 (1931). The original divorce, or divorce a mensa et thoro, did dissolve
the marital status (although neither party was permitted to remarry) while preserving all
other incidents of the marital relationship, including dower.
44 See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
45 Huber v. Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 539, 209 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1960), which upheld an
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Second, there is no justification for a distinction which protects only
those rights that could have been preserved despite the granting of the
divorce. Mrs. Simons could, in effect, have defended her dower interest
by actively resisting the granting of the divorce itself. She would not
have been independently pursuing her dower interest as she would her
right to alimony, but successful contesting of the divorce would have
preserved her dower right. Thus, even though Mrs. Simons could not
raise dower as an independent issue, she was in fact disadvantaged by
not appearing. A valuable right was cut off, and she might have pre-
vented this had she contested the divorce. Hence there is no reason to
modify Vanderbilt to protect only those rights which can be indepen-
dently claimed in the divorce proceeding. The essential consideration,
as stated by the Florida court itself in the Pawley case, is that any rule
should rest on the question of whether "the defendant wife under such
circumstances has ... had her day in court." 46 The Supreme Court's
decision in Simons does not appear to meet that test.
The rationale of the fourth and fifth distinctions between dower and
alimony is that dower is not part of the husband's support obligation
and therefore need not be protected from termination by an ex parte
divorce. Alimony, this argument suggests, more nearly corresponds to
the wife's needs for both herself and her children. Dower, on the other
hand, is felt to represent a property interest that is in no way related
to the wife's needs. But this is no longer the case: All states but one
have abolished common law dower,4 7 most either substituting a more
general right of election against the husband's will, as in New York,48
or expanding the dower rights to include a fraction of the husband's
personal property, as in Florida.49 The courts have generally inter-
preted these new statutory provisions as extending the husband's obli-
gation to support his wife and children beyond his death.50 If the legis-
absent spouse's interest in a tenancy by the entirety that would have been transmuted
into a tenancy in common had the spouse appeared, supports the argument that the
mere fact that a party benefits by not appearing does not give any extra force to a
decree entered by a court unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over the affected party.
46 Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 472 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950).
47 Only South Carolina maintains the common law dower. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-153
(1962).
48 N.Y. DacaD. EsT. LAW § 18.
49 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.34 (1964). See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A
Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. Cm. L. RFv. 681 & n.1 (1966).
50 See Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 271-72, 2 So. 2d 855, 857 (1941), in which the
Florida Supreme Court stated: "Dower is that portion of the deceased husband's estate
admeasured to the widow for her support and the support of the children." In response
to the allegation that it was unconstitutional to reduce a childless wife's dower, the
court said: "Since the basis of it is bread for the widow and children, it cannot be said
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latures have enacted these "modern" dower interests in order to pro-
vide continuing support for the widow over the period of time during
which she survives her husband, there is no discernible distinction be-
tween the two "segments" of the husband's support obligation. The
wife's domiciliary state has as great an interest in preventing her be-
coming a ward of the state after her husband's death as before. 51 Thus
there is no basis for distinguishing between the absent wife's interest
in that segment of her right to support arising, after her husband's
death and the segment arising prior to his death.
The sixth distinction suggested by the Court's quotation from Pawley
is that dower, unlike alimony, is a traditional property interest. The
premise of this argument is that dower constitutes a standard in rem
question and consequently may be determined by a court exercising
jurisdiction over the res. However, the use of labels such as in rem,
quasi in rem, or in personam is a poor substitute for reasoned anal-
ysis. 52 Traditionally, a state's interest in the free alienation of local
property-particularly real property-is sufficient to allow its courts
to adjudicate questions of title in circumstances where jurisdiction is
based only on constructive service. At the same time, however, it is
quite clear that alimony or other support obligations may not be dis-
solved by a court at the husband's request solely because the property
necessary to fulfill that obligation is located within the state.53 The
question to be analyzed, therefore, is whether dower in a divorce con-
text is more properly viewed as a traditional property question or as
an aspect of the husband's support obligation, and consequently,
whether it is fair to force the wife to appear in an inconvenient forum
on penalty of forfeiture.
As argued above, "modern" dower is an extension of the husband's
support obligation and analogous to alimony. Thus, to the extent
that the needs of the childless widow are the equivalent of those of the widow on whom
there are dependent children." Id. at 272, 2 So. 2d at 857. See In re Boesenberg's Estate,
179 Misc. 3, 37 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Surn. Ct. 1942) (holding that the purpose of the act was to
prevent the husband from avoiding his support obligation); In re Jackson's Will, 177
Misc. 480, 31 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sun. Ct. 1941).
51 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
52 There is mounting support for ending the traditional in rem-in personam distinc-
tion, and substituting a scheme of "particularized jurisdictional rules" based upon con-
siderations of "ease of administration and equity." The result would be to substitute
for the traditional labels an interest analysis to be applied to each problem. See, e.g.,
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241, 281-88.
53 In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957), the Court observed: "It has long
been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obliga-
tion unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant."
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that a divorce proceeding relates to the wife's dower rights, it is a
dispute over the limits of the husband's support obligation, as opposed
to a suit to determine title to local realty or personalty. It follows
that, as in the case of alimony, it is unfair to compel the wife to
appear in an inconvenient forum to defend the valuable support right
of dower. Nevertheless, dower, unlike alimony, can constitute an en-
cumbrance on real property under Florida law, and this to some extent
conflicts with the state's policy in favor of free alienation. This might
tend to support the result reached in the Simons case were it not for
the fact that Mr. Simons' estate consisted solely of intangibles. To the
extent that dower represents a general claim to a percentage of the
estate, as in New York, or to a percentage of the personalty, as in
Florida, it is analogous to alimony and should be treated accordingly.
A court might well decide that where dower creates an encumbrance
on real property, its adjudication falls within the traditional in rem
jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which the property is located.
But that should not preclude a holding that where, as here, there is
no encumbrance, the court will protect the right of the absent spouse.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant in the past to extend the
scope of ex parte divorce. It appears to have adopted the doctrine in
Williams only for the purpose of alleviating an intolerable situation.54
Apart from the limited rule of Williams, the Court has systematically
prevented all other rights arising out of the marital relationship from
being extinguished in an ex parte proceeding. Indeed, the Court has
consistently prevented the husband from avoiding any obligations aris-
ing in the marital domicile by moving out of the state.5 5 It would have
been more consistent with these objectives if the Court in Simons had
protected the wife's dower rights, for the Court's holding cannot be
justified on the basis of any distinction between the wife's dower right
and her rights in the incidents of marriage which the Court has pro-
tected.
Is it Significant That Mrs. Simons Sued in
Florida under Florida Law for Florida Property?
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion obviously relies heavily on the fact
that Florida law provides that the right to dower is cut off by a
divorce granted by the courts of that state. This reliance implies that a
court which renders an ex parte divorce has more power to cut off
54 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
55 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
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support rights arising under its own law than support rights which
arise under the law of another state. This would suggest that the Van-
derbilt case, involving the authority of a Nevada court to cut off sup-
port rights which arose under New York law, would have been decided
differently had the Nevada court been attempting to cut off a right
arising under its own laws.
But surely such a rule would beg the constitutional question. Florida
undoubtedly has the legislative power to define dower as totally de-
pendent upon continuance of the marital status. However, it does not
necessarily follow that such a rule can constitutionally be applied to a
divorce proceeding defendant who has been served only constructively.
The essential question is not whether Florida may enact such a statute,
but whether Florida may constitutionally apply such a statute to an
absent spouse in an ex parte divorce proceeding-whether it may
constitutionally cut off the valuable property right of an absent spouse
while terminating the marital status. The due process clause would
appear to dictate that this question be answered in the negative. The
fact that the right to dower arises under the law of the divorcing state,
although relevant,56 is not sufficient justification for the conclusion that
such a right can constitutionally be extinguished in an ex parte
proceeding.
The Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation in the May case,
in which a Wisconsin divorce court, exercising jurisdiction over a hus-
band and children who were domiciled in Wisconsin, had applied Wis-
consin law to grant the husband an ex parte divorce and custody of
the children. The absent wife, who sued in Ohio for custody, lost on
the ground that the Wisconsin court had sufficient jurisdiction under
its statutes to enter a custody decree. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ohio court on the theory that a precious right arising out
of the marital relationship may not be terminated by an ex parte
decree. It was apparently immaterial that the Wisconsin statute autho-
rized the state court to determine the "right" or that Ohio looked to
Wisconsin for this determination. The May case thus provides sup-
port for the contention that all valuable rights arising from the marital
relationship must survive an ex parte divorce, regardless of the statu-
tory source of the rights which the divorcing court purports to cut off.
Therefore, the fact that Mrs. Simons sued in Florida to vindicate a
Florida-created right would not appear to justify the Simons result.
56 It is relevant only to the extent that a state has some interest in enforcing its own
laws.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The dower right held extinguishable by an ex parte decree in
Simons is substantively identical to the alimony right deemed unex-
tinguishable in Vanderbilt. Therefore, Simons can only be read as a re-
treat by the Court from its prior holding in Vanderbilt. It is contended
here that this is an undesirable result. The Florida judgment raised
serious due process questions which were overlooked by the Court:
dower appears to be a right too valuable to be extinguishable, con-
sistent with due process, in an inconvenient forum whose jurisdiction
is based only on constructive service. Although an ex parte divorce is
entitled to full faith and credit, it must not become a vehicle by
which a husband can avoid his marital obligations; it should affect
only the status of the parties involved.
